What if the next missile strike on your infrastructure didn’t come from the sky or over the horizon—but from inside your own borders? What if the weapons weren’t launched by jets or submarines, but by what looked like a delivery truck parked quietly outside your base?
That’s not science fiction. That’s modern war. In this post I want to dive into a very specific aspect of two recent global events that shared one under reported, yet key aspect, the actual attack vector.
In two of the most strategically significant attacks of 2025, both Ukraine and Israel employed a nearly identical tactic: using stealthy or civilian-looking vehicles to smuggle drones and missiles deep into enemy territory, set up covert staging areas, and launch surprise attacks from within. These operations weren’t just successful, they caught the defenders completely off guard, bypassing air defenses and radar, and obliterating critical targets with no early warning.
While both of these operations were successful and impressive in their ambition and scale, its not the operations themselves that I want to focus on in this article. Instead, its one of the main vectors that allowed these engagements to be successful … The humble truck.
Before we get into the meat of this topic, we need to discuss exactly what happened in both events.
Ukraine’s “Operation Spider’s Web”
In early June 2025, Ukraine executed what may be the most devastating long-range drone operation of the war. Codenamed Spider’s Web, the attack saw over 117 FPV drones launched against five key Russian airbases across thousands of kilometers. These weren’t launched from Ukraine. They were launched inside Russia—assembled and deployed from civilian trucks driven near each target.
These trucks carried makeshift wooden enclosures resembling sheds. Inside were small quadcopter drones, each carrying explosives and pre-programmed with flight paths to hit high-value aircraft. Targets included Tu-95s, Tu-160s, and Tu-22M bombers—Russia’s main platforms for launching long-range cruise missiles. Ukraine claims 13 to 20 aircraft destroyed and another dozen damaged. Independent analysts estimate this represents about a third of Russia’s long-range bomber force.
Videos released by Ukraine’s SBU show FPV drone feeds diving directly into bombers’ fuel tanks, parked on tarmacs. There was no warning. No sirens. Just destruction.
This wasn't some backdoor skirmish—it was strategic-scale sabotage, enabled by the anonymity of a civilian vehicle parked where it shouldn’t be.
Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion”
Roughly a week later, the world watched in stunned silence as Israeli warplanes launched a massive overnight bombing raid inside Iran. The airstrikes were precise and devastating. But they weren’t the beginning of the operation—they were the end.
What made this campaign possible was what happened before the jets arrived.
According to multiple reports, Mossad had spent months smuggling weaponized drones, explosives, and targeting data into Iran. Some were hidden in suitcases, others in shipping containers, and many more in trucks disguised as civilian logistics assets. These platforms were quietly staged near military and nuclear infrastructure—including in the heart of Tehran. In the opening hours of the assault, Mossad drones disabled radar sites, missile launchers, and command posts across the country, effectively blinding Iran’s defenses.
That’s when Israel sent in over 200 warplanes, striking more than 100 high-value targets with over 330 guided munitions. The strikes hit nuclear research centers, ballistic missile sites, IRGC headquarters, and multiple underground bunkers. Iranian state TV was so unprepared, one anchor fled the studio live on-air as explosions ripped through the city.
Again, this wasn’t just an airstrike. It was a covert logistics-to-attack pipeline, and its lynchpin was the mobility and deniability of trucks carrying concealed weapon systems.
Shared Playbook: Sneak-In Attacks Using Stealth Vehicles
These two operations, Ukraine’s Spider’s Web and Israel’s Rising Lion, demonstrate a terrifying new warfare paradigm: attacks launched from within, initiated by carrying drones, missiles, or sabotage tools inside the target country using civilian-like vehicles.
Why Such Attacks Work
1. Smuggling Made Easier by Volume and Inadequate Inspection
Borders see massive traffic: in the U.S. alone, over 100,000 commercial cargo trucks pass through ports of entry every single day. Yet, only a fraction are checked: about 15% of trucks, 5.2% of sea containers, and 22.6% of rail containers are physically inspected
Screening is designed for speed and commerce—not advanced weapon detection. Even with under-vehicle scanners like VACIS, it takes 7–10 minutes per truck, making widespread inspection impractical. Despite rising threats, the combination of high volume and limited resources means it’s statistically straightforward to blend in one weaponized truck among thousands daily.
Rotterdam, the largest port in Europe, handles an extraordinary volume of container traffic, processing an average of approximately 38,000 containers per day moving through the port. Yet, only an estimated 2% to 5% of these containers are physically inspected. That means over 36,000 containers daily pass through without detailed scrutiny.
Many are quickly transferred onto trucks and dispersed across the Netherlands and the wider European continent.
2. No Warning, No Defense
Because the attack vehicle is already inside and parked close to the target, radar and air defense systems are bypassed entirely. There is no missile launch detected, no inbound flight path, and often no timeframe—the explosive deployment happens without triggering conventional warning layers. By the time fireballs erupt, it's over: defenders get minimal to zero minutes to prepare or react.
3. Attribution Blackout via Self‑Destruct
These vehicles can be rigged to self-destruct during or immediately after the strike, eliminating physical evidence. Without wreckage to analyze—no serial numbers, no IP addresses, no fingerprints—forensic linking back to the attacker becomes nearly impossible.
If you think about it, the only real reason we know who was responsible for both of the above real world attacks was because they told us. Had nobody actually claimed responsibility, or worse, if they started falsely pointing fingers it would have been up to the world to decide who we thought was responsible.
Cost: The One Fragile Barrier
While terrifyingly effective, the one potential saving grace of this attack vector is cost. Outfitting a single civilian truck with 50–100 FPV drones, each equipped with navigation, communications gear, and small explosive payloads, would likely cost $250,000 to $500,000 per vehicle, depending on range, control systems, and detonation technology. That price tag places it well beyond the reach of most criminals or lone actors.
But for state-sponsored actors, intelligence agencies, and major terrorist organizations, this is not just affordable, it’s scalable. These groups operate on budgets of millions (or billions), and the strategic value of such an attack, crippling air defenses, silencing nuclear sites, or destroying strategic bombers, far outweighs the operational cost.
In short: money may slow this tactic, but it won’t stop it. And once someone proves it works, cost tends to come down fast.
Strategic Implications
Both operations succeeded for the same reason: the attack began inside the perimeter.
Key Impacts
Bypasses National Defense: No radar detection, no missile intercepts—because the threat never crossed a defended border.
Blurs Civilian & Military Lines: Trucks and containers are now valid delivery systems for lethal force.
Enables Asymmetric Power Projection: A small, mobile team can now damage assets worth billions—without air superiority.
Demands a New Defense Doctrine: Early warning systems must now look inward—at logistics, infrastructure, and civilian vehicle movements.
Conclusion
The use of stealth vehicles to deliver and launch attacks from within a target country represents a shift in modern warfare, one that bypasses traditional defense systems, overwhelms security infrastructure, and leaves virtually no trace for retaliation.
With ports of entry across the world processing tens of thousands of containers or vehicles daily and inspecting only a fraction, the probability of a weaponized truck slipping through is disturbingly high.
While cost may still limit this tactic to state actors and well-funded groups, the method itself is low-profile, scalable, and devastatingly effective. As these operations in Ukraine and Iran have shown, the next warhead may not come over the border, it may already be parked next door.
euronews.com/next/2025/06/18/israels-spy-agency-used-ai-and-smuggled-in-drones-to-prepare-attack-on-iran-sources-say
Unfortunately for Ukraine, it was a complete waste of money - because Russia is still going to win the war. Anyone looking at the "military balance" knew that was always going to be the case from day one, regardless of US/NATO support (other than supplying nukes.)
Iran is a more difficult proposition to call. Without massive US support, Israel does not have the logistics to carry out too many long-range attacks, certainly not enough to prevent Iran from raining missiles and drones down on Israel. Iran has more missiles and drones than Israel has aircraft. Although only perhaps a thousand of the missile arsenal have the range to reach Israel proper, Iran's short-range missiles will do massive damage to US assets in the region - possibly including the Saudi oil fields and certainly closing the Straits of Hormuz to civilian traffic. Despite US Navy claims that they can keep the Straits open, this simply isn't possible