A Look At China's Talent Programs
In previous posts, we’ve explored the dangers of insider threats—whether it's an employee who’s unintentionally careless with sensitive information or one who's actively working to undermine security from within. We’ve also discussed how physical spaces often suffer from the same vulnerabilities as flat network structures, where even the intern can gain access to areas meant for top-level executives.
One of the reasons why insider threats are so dangerous is that these are people who often have full access to your facility, at least partial access to your cyber space and you have already vetted them. Further, because they are employees, you are literally paying their bills, which means that they may not have any need to rush in attempting to gain access to extremely sensitive things or places.
For example, Linda Sun, a former aide to New York Governors Andrew Cuomo and Kathy Hochul, spent years gaining favor, building networks and raising in the ranks with the alleged goal of furthering China’s policies in New York.
So today, we’re focusing on China as a threat actor, some of its methods for infiltrating organizations which include projects such as the Thousand Talents Program (TTP), the purchasing of US farmland and other initiatives.
What is the Chinese Thousand Talents Program?
The Thousand Talents Program is a state-sponsored initiative launched by China to recruit global experts, primarily in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. While at first glance, it appears to be a legitimate effort to bolster China’s scientific and technological capabilities by attracting top talent, the program has a darker side. It is closely linked to efforts to steal intellectual property (IP) and confidential data from Western institutions, including corporations, research facilities, and government agencies.
One of the most difficult aspects of this program for the West, is how do you know if a Chinese national is apart of this program? Suppose for example you have a Chinese person who has no criminal background, went to an Ivy League US University where they graduated with honors, is this profile suspect?
To be fair, it is only natural for countries such as China to suspect a US national who may find themselves working in a major or sensitive job within China of potentially having ulterior motives, but this is the nature of insider threats.
Through the Thousand Talents Program, China has recruited thousands of experts, many of whom have access to advanced technologies, cutting-edge research, and sensitive corporate or government information. These recruits, often embedded in Western institutions, can be coerced into or willingly participate in transferring valuable information back to China. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned that talent programs like these are part of China's larger strategy to exploit vulnerabilities in Western systems .
An example of this type of recruitment from Harvard University
The case of Dr. Charles Lieber, a Harvard professor and leading nanoscience expert, who was arrested along with two Chinese nationals for involvement in activities related to China's Thousand Talents Program. Lieber had received a $15 million grant from the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Institutes of Health, which required him to disclose any foreign affiliations. However, he failed to reveal that since 2011, he had secretly been part of China’s recruitment plan.
From 2012 to 2017, Lieber was contracted as a "strategic scientist" at Wuhan University of Technology (WUT), where he was paid $50,000 per month, received additional living expenses, and was granted $1.5 million to set up a research lab. His agreement obligated him to spend nine months a year in China, transfer his knowledge, train Chinese Ph.D. students, and publish research under WUT's name. Harvard eventually discovered Lieber was supplementing his salary through this covert Chinese contract, which raised significant ethical and legal concerns.
China encourages scientists who have acquired knowledge in the West to return to China and bring, often classified, knowledge with them by giving them many lucrative enticements. According to a study by Standford University
“YTT returnees also outperformed their overseas peers in last-authored publications by 144%, suggesting that upon return, they were more likely to become independent researchers pursuing their own scientific agendas.”
There is a good resources for mapping some of the active Chinese talent programs which you can access here. Keep in mind that this tool only covers a few of the talent programs. According to CSIS spokesperson Eric Balsam
“there are more than 200 Chinese "talent recruitment programmes" over which Beijing exerts "exceptional levels of control."
Circling Back To Insider Threats
When designing a secure network, no one in their right mind would give every user administrator privileges. Why? Because the more access a person has, the greater the potential for damage, whether intentional or accidental. Yet, when it comes to physical spaces, we often overlook the same logic. Many businesses and organizations grant employees unrestricted or near-unrestricted access to their entire premises, regardless of their role or security clearance.
Just like a cyber network, physical buildings need to have security zones and tiered access levels. Not everyone should have the same access to every room, server room, lab, or storage area. There should be layers of access—just as firewalls and credentials segment digital systems. The idea is simple: if every employee, from the CEO to the intern, can roam freely across all areas of a building, then there is little control over sensitive spaces or information.
Insider threats aren't just external burglars or cyber hackers trying to "break in". Insider threats come from trusted, vetted employees who already have some degree of access to sensitive areas. These aren't random criminals sneaking in after hours—they are individuals the company or organization has approved, trusted, and provided with the keys to the kingdom, so to speak. They can be intelligent, observant, and capable of using their authorized access to gradually undermine security measures.
If a foreign government offered you one million dollars and a luxury home in their country to betray your company, many would say absolutely not, but there is always going to be some who can be enticed in this way.
And while you may think that only the IT Admins would have access to XYZ and therefore they are the only employees you need to be worried about turning on you; if the 19 year old intern has physical access to the server room, CEO’s laptop, board of directors private meeting room, … , he has just as much access and likely far less to lose.
Unfortunately, a million dollars is not what it usually takes to get someone, especially young, to betray their company, or even country, as this 26 year old US serviceman sold classified radar specs to the Chinese for $15,000 which landed him in federal prison.
Conclusion
The Chinese Thousand Talents Program highlights just how sophisticated insider threats can be. It shows that even seemingly legitimate and highly skilled individuals—whether they come from foreign recruitment programs or have been hired and trusted by your organization—can pose a significant risk.
Insider threats aren’t just theoretical risks; they are real, and they are often more dangerous than external attackers because they operate within the trusted boundaries of your company.
However, the purpose of this article isn’t to make you distrust your employees or colleagues. The vast majority of employees are loyal and dedicated, but it’s critical to be aware of the dangers posed by a flat and open physical security structure. Even those you trust the most—your beloved and valued employees—could, under the right circumstances, betray that trust, whether through negligence or malice. That’s why it's crucial to put measures in place to safeguard your organization.